Research project : GOBACEAC

Central banks governance after the crisis : the BCE case

  1. Overview
  2. Team and partners
  3. Abstract

Project funded by Maison des Sciences de l'Homme en Bretagne (MSHB)
Scientific responsible  : Guillaume L'Oeillet (CREM, Université Rennes 1)

Overview

This research project focuses on the expected changes of the central banks governance, after economic crisis.

It is about a multidisciplinary project including three Breton economists of Université de Rennes1, Université de Bretagne Sud, Université de Bretagne Occidentale as weel as a political scientist, a sociologist, and a lawyer.

These reseachers aims to identify changes imposed by recent events and see in what this can impact central banks missions and organization, notably in European cases. They will also questioned independance in the light of  the last decade to find out if this principle will change in  a new democratic context, where technocracy and european institutions are underminded. Finally, we will ask if financial stability will modify relationships between central banks and the financial sphere.

Team and partners

Pole : Gouvernance
Disciplines : Droit public, Sciences Economiques, Sciences politiques, Sciences économiques, Sociologie
Regional partners : EA 2652 LEGO | UMR 6211 CREM
National partners : UMR 5194 PACTE | UMR 8533 IDHES | EA 7263 EDEHN
Duration : 01-09-2017 / 31-08-2019
 

Abstract

Before the crisis, the external governance of central banks was independent from the political area in order to keep away short-sighted and self-serving politicians. The independence was associated to transparency and a clear communication towards economic agents. The internal governance mainly dealt with the institutional framework of monetary policy committees and their members. The crisis may have widely changed the role of the Central bank in the public debate.

De facto, the independence has been discussed when the extent of the recession has forced governments and central banks to coordinate closely their actions while the consensus recommended a clear separation of their roles in 80s. Moreover, the price stability does not appear as a protection against financial turmoils. The financial stability is now on the top of the list of the central bank objectives again. This shift may have important consequences on the organisation of monetary authorities: in addition to the political independence, central banks should define a financial independence towards the financial sector. The reformed governance should manage the risk of a potential financial capture of the institution.