Abstract : Collective choice mainly aims to reach social outcomes that reflect “compromises” for the
society. Quite surprisingly, the theory of social choice, whose aim is to describe formally
mechanisms that aggregate preferences into a social outcome (e.g. voting rules), seems to lack
a formal elaboration of what a compromise means.
Our objective is to define more precisely this
concept in two particular contexts: the choice of a winning alternative and the selection of a
committee that reflects appropriately the different opinions of the society. Our first aim will
be analyze the notion of compromise from an axiomatic perspective, seeking for the properties a
compromise should satisfy and possibly give some axiomatic characterization of different
Secondly, using game theory, decision theory and experimental economics, we wish to predict and describe the behavior of the voters when using decision schemes that should
in principle lead to compromise.
Duration: from 1st January 2018 to 31th Decembre 2020
The PICS 08001 France/Turkey is a collaboration between Turkey and France, it's the association for this project of :
- French side : CREM (UMR 6211), LAMSADE (UMR7243 - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision), PJSE (UMR 8545 - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques) et LIRSA (EA 4603 – Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Sciences de l’Action)
- Turkish side : Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies (IstanbulBilgi University).
In France the project is supported by Vincent Merlin, research director at CNRS (CREM, UMR 6211), and in Turkey by Ipek Oskal Sanver, economics professor (Istanbul Bilgi University).