[Séminaire CREM] Strong Nash Implementation in Finite and Infinte Fair Allocation Problems

Présentation de Mohamed BOUCHTA, National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics

[Séminaire CREM] Strong Nash Implementation in Finite and Infinte Fair Allocation Problems
CREM
Lundi 23 mai, 16h00

**Abstract:** In this paper we provide new necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence (SCC) to be implementable in strong Nash equilibr ia. Our first new proper ty, coalit ional rationality is shown to he necessary via a surjective mechanism for any strongly implementable SCC and to be sufficient along with unanimity. Our second new propert ies, weak coalitional rationality and coalitional weak no-veto power are shown to be sufficient along with Maskin monotonicity and unanimity. We finally provide applications of our result in fini te fair allocation problems for matching markets and in infinite fair allocation problems under domain restrictions with private values. _Co-écrit avec Ahmed Doghmi et Abderrahmane Ziad_