Providing public utilities in a common agency framework: making, buying and governance

Présentation de Alexandre Mayol (PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)

 2018-02-22_mayol-alexandre

Alexandre Mayol (PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
En collaboration avec Benjamin Michallet et Antoine Prévet

Abstract: This article analyzes how the local political organization (in France, the level of the single municipality, the union of communes (Syndicats) or super-municipality (communauté de communes) and the management mode (public or private) can influence the performance of the public service. The impact of these organizational configurations on costs has never been studied simultaneously by the literature. We first propose a theoretical model based on a principal-agent problem to analyze them together. Then, from a panel of French water services, we observe empirically that these different organizational combinations have an impact on the price.

Keywords: make-or-buy, multiprincipal, agency relationship, organizational choices, benchmarking, water, public utilies