Intensity valence

Présentation de Fabian Gouret (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, ThéMA)

2017-12-11_sem_caen_flyer
Fabian Gouret (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, ThéMA) - Séminaire du lundi 11 décembre, Salle des actes - SH 027 de 14h15 à 15h45.
 
Titre : Intensity valence
 
Co-auteur : Stéphane Rossignol
 

Résumé : This paper studies a continuous one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition  with two office-motivated candidates differentiated by their “intensity” valence. All voters agree that one candidate will implement more intensively his announced policy than his opponent. However, and contrary to existing models, the intensity valence has a different impact on the utility of voters according to their position in the policy space. The assumption that voters have utility functions with intensity valence, an assumption which has been found to be grounded empirically, generates very different results than those obtained with traditional utility functions with additive valence. First, the candidate with low intensity valence is supported by voters whose ideal points are on both extremes of the policy space. Second, there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the winner is the candidate with high intensity if the distribution of voters in the policy space is sufficiently homogeneous. On the contrary, if the distribution of voters in the policy space is very heterogeneous, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the candidate with low intensity wins. For moderate heterogeneity of the distribution of voters, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.