18-19 juin 2014 - Workshop ANR « Competition and bargaining in vertical chains »

Competition and Bargaining in Vertical Chains

Download the program

Vertical chains are industry structures where some firms (at the upstream level) supply other firms (at the downstream level). Imperfect competition in general prevails at both levels, and upstream and downstream firms bargain with one another. The goal of this project is to deepen our understanding of the industrial organization of vertical chains in terms of competition and bargaining to analyze its consequence on the price, variety and quality of the products offered to consumers. To reach this goal, the project combines theoretical industrial organization research with empirical and experimental approaches. Four research teams are involved in the project : CREM (Université de Rennes 1 – Université de Caen Basse Normandie - CNRS), ALISS (INRA, Ivry-sur-Seine, France), Toulouse School of Economics and DICE (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics). There are about 30 participants including participants who are not members of these four teams.

Les chaînes verticales sont des structures industrielles dans lesquelles des firmes (amont) sont les fournisseurs d’autres firmes (aval). La concurrence est souvent imparfaite tant en amont qu’en aval et les firmes négocient les conditions de leurs échanges. Le but de ce projet est d’approfondir notre compréhension des mécanismes économiques à l’œuvre dans les chaînes verticales et de leurs implications en termes de prix, variété et qualité des produits et services offerts aux consommateurs. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le projet combine une approche d’économie industrielle théorique avec des approches empiriques et expérimentales. Quatre équipes de recherche sont impliquées dans ce projet (qui compte une trentaine de participants, dont certains ne sont pas membres de ces 4 équipes) : CREM (Université de Rennes 1 – Université de Caen Basse Normandie - CNRS), ALISS (INRA, Ivry-sur-Seine, France), Toulouse School of Economics et DICE (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics).

 
PROGRAM
Day 1 - Wednesday, June 18th

9:30 - 10:00 - Registration and Welcome Coffee

10:00 - 11:30 - Session 1

  • The Impact of “One Stop Shopping”- Induced Purchasing Complementarities in Structural Econometric Models of Retails Competition
    Ulrich Heimeshoff, Gordon Klein and Dennis Rickert    
    Discussant : Joeffrey Drouard
  • How Countervailing Power Translates Into Higher Consumer Prices : A Multi-Stop Shopping Setting
    Stéphane Caprice and Shiva Shekhar    
    Discussant : Bjørn Olav Johansen

     

11:30-11:45 - Coffee Break

11:45-13:15 - Session 2

  • Equilibrium Strategic Overbuying
    Éric Avenel and Clémence Christin
  • Secret Contracting with Interlocking Relationships
    Thibaud Vergé and Patrick Rey    
    Discussant : Guy Meunier

     

13:15-14:30 - Lunch

14:30-16:00 - Session 3

  • Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization
    Stéphane Caprice, Vanessa von Schlippenbach and Christian Wey    
    Discussant : Clémence Christin
  • Optimal Licensing in Complementary Markets
    Clément Dheilly    
    Discussant : Ozlem Bedre-Defolie

     

16:00-16:15 - Coffee Break

16:15-17:45 - Session 4

  • Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up,
    Marie-Laure Allain, Claire Chambolle and Patrick Rey    
    Discussant : Noriaki Matsushima
  • Resale Price Maintenance in Two-Sided Market
    Tommy S. Gabrielsen, Bjørn Olav Johansen and Teis L. Lomo
    Discussant : Clément Dheilly

     

19:30 Dinner
Day 2 - Thursday, June 19th

9:30-11:00 - Session 5

  • Exclusive Contracts with Complementary Inputs
    Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima and Misato Sato
    Discussant : Eric Avenel
  • Integration vs Separation when Upstream Investments Matter
    Olga Rozanova    
    Discussant : Olivier Bonroy

     

11:00-11:15 - Coffee Break

11:15-12:45 - Session 6

  • Communication in a Vertical Market Structure : Experimental Evidence
    Claudia Möllers, Hans-Theo Normann, Christopher M. Snyder
    Discussant : David Masclet
  • On the benefits of contractual inefficiency in quality-differentiated markets
    Olivier Bonroy and Emanuele Bacchiega
    Discussant : Christian Wey

     

12:45-14:00 - Lunch

14:00-15:30 - Session 7

  • Heterogeneous Choice Sets in Structural Models of Demand and Supply
    Anna Lu and Lars Zeigermann    
    Discussant : Sophie Larribeau
  • Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information,
    Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton and Antonio Nicolo
    Discussant : Laurent Denant-Boemont

     

15:30-16:00 - Closing Session and Farewell

*Authors marked in bold attend the workshop

Participants