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Accueil > Séminaires réguliers > Séminaires Caen > Archives

2009-2010

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Les séminaires du CREM à Caen ont lieu salle EG107

UFR Sciences Economiques et de Gestion de Caen, 19 rue Claude Bloch, le lundi à partir de 14h


  • Lundi 21 juin 2010
Intervenant Sylvain Ouattara, doctorant au CREM
Invité par / invited by Nicolas Lepape
Thème / Subject Oligopole mixte, fusion, coûts quadratiques, efficacité.
Titre / title Profitabilité des fusions dans un oligopole mixte asymétrique
Co-auteurs/Joint work with
Résumé / abstract Cet article analyse la profitabilité des fusions dans un oligopole mixte asymétrique constitué de deux firmes privées identiques et d’une firme publique. Nous supposons qu’il existe un écart technologique entre la firme publique et les firmes privées et que la fusion s’accompagne d’une rationalisation de la production. Nous montrons que l’acquisition partielle d’une entreprise publique ayant un retard technologique par une entreprise privée, peut être bénéfique aussi bien pour le bien-être que pour les actionnaires privés lorsque ces derniers acquièrent au moins 43% des actions de l’entité fusionnée.
Lien / download 10_06_21_ouattara.pdf

  • Lundi 7 juin 2010, 14h, EG107
Intervenant Abderrahmane Ziad, Université de Caen
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject Publics economics and game theory
Titre / title Further Consideration of the Existence of Nash Equilibria in a Fiscal competition Game
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, CNRS, CES, Université Paris 1
Résumé / abstract In this methodological paper we prove that the key tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) possesses a Nash equilibrium under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature : goods are supposed to be normal ; the public good is assumed to be a desired good ; the third derivative of each production function is assumed to be positive ; and the difference between the elasticity of the marginal product of capital and the elasticity of the second marginal product of capital is assumed to be less than 1. The general framework we develop enables us to obtain very tractable results. By applying our method to several examples with standard production functions, we show that it is easy to use. We depart from the previous literature by the generality of our framework and in particular, by allowing for asymmetric production functions.
Lien / download 10_06_07_ziad.pdf (PDF - 214 Ko)

  • Lundi 31 mai 2010, 14h, EG107
Intervenant Françoise Bastié (page en construction), Université de Caen
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject Entrepreneurship & finance
Titre / title The Survival of New Firms : Do Bank Loans at Birth Matter ?
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Sylvie Cieply et Pascal Cussy, CREM, Université de Caen
Résumé / abstract While many studies deal with policy implications to reduce the problem of financial constraints on new firms, the role of access to banking loans and its consequences on entrepreneurship remain unclear. In this article, we investigate the extent to which the survival of new firms, once started, is affected by a limited use of banking loans at the time of their start. As bankers assess the probability of new firms’ survival when they decide to grant a loan, the endogeneity of financial variables is taken into account in an empirical model that introduces all usual determinants of new firms’ survival as well. This model is tested on a sample of French new firms by using the SINE database of the INSEE. Our results stress the significant and positive impact of banking loans on the survival time of new firms even after the correction of the omitted-variables bias. Bank loans persistently impact the survival of start-ups at the turning of the last century in France. Our study shows as well that the screening of banks on the population of new firms allows them to distinguish (however not perfectly) among “good” firms and “bad” ones. Banks cannot perfectly identify the future successful new firms but their screening must be taken into account by both academic studies and policy makers
Lien / download 10_05_31_bastie.pdf

  • Lundi 17 mai 2010, 14h, EG107
Intervenant Remzi Sanver, Bilgi University, Istanbul
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Social choice theory
Titre / title Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Ceyhun Coban, Washington University at St. Louis
Résumé / abstract We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.
Lien / download 10_05_17_sanver.pdf (PDF - 150 Ko)

  • Lundi 10 mai 2010, 15h, SEMINAIRE ANNULE
Intervenant William S. Zwicker, Union College, New York
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Social choice theory
Titre / title Old and New Monotonicity Properties
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Remzi Sanver
Résumé / abstract We explore the logical connections among two known properties – monotonicity and participation – and two new ones – one-way monotonicity and half-way monotonicity. By elaborating an argument due to Moulin, we show that every Condorcet extension for four or more alternatives fails half-way monotonicity. This means that it can be manipulated via a “total misrepresentation” of preferences.
Lien / download 10_05_10_Zwicker.pdf (PDF - 47 Ko)

  • Lundi 3 mai 2010, EG104
Intervenant Ipek Sanver, Bilgi University, Istanbul
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Matching
Titre / title Consistency and Converse Consistency for Matching Problems
Co-auteurs/Joint work with
Résumé / abstract We revisit the consistency and converse consistency axioms in marriage and roommate problems. First, we study two sided one-to-one mataching problems and consider the most wellknown solution concept : the men-optimal solution. The men-optimal solution fails consistency, as well as converse consistency. Thanks to Sasaki and Toda (1992) we know that the minimal consistent extension of the men-optimal solution equals to the core , here we compute its minimal converse consistent extension as the set consisting of the men-optimal matching, and all stable and men-barterproof matchings for this problem. Next, we study one sided matching problems. We show that no core extension satisfies consistency. We also show that Pareto optimality, anonymity and converse consistency are logically incompatible.
Lien / download 10_05_03_sanver.pdf (PDF - 169 Ko)

  • Lundi 26 avril 2010
Intervenant Marcus Dejardin, FUNDP, Namur et Erasmus University, Roterdam
Invité par / invited by Jean Bonnet
Thème / Subject Entrepreneurship
Titre / title What do we know about spatial entry ?
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Nicolas Debarsy
Résumé / abstract In his oft-cited « What do we know about entry ? », Paul Geroski (1995) surveys empirical works on this central topic in industrial organization regarding market dynamics. Surprisingly, his article remains silent on the spatial dimension of these dynamics. The paper gives, first, support to some of the Geroski’s a-spatial observations with reference to firm entries and exits of a selection of retail and consumer service industries in Belgium over the 1998-2001 period. More important is the proposed application of the Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) that has been developed for in-depth exploring of spatial datasets. Evidences are collected at highly disaggregated geographical and industrial levels. They do not only contribute to a better understanding of the geographical patterns of the industries, but they lead to interesting observations regarding industrial organization and market dynamics by examining the space-time structures of entries and exits. These observations may be considered as an opening tribute towards a spatial extension of what Geroski has presented as stylized facts in his 1995 article.
Lien / download What do we know about spatial entry ? (PDF - 211 ko)

  • Lundi 19 avril 2010
Intervenant Mathilde Aubry, doctorante au CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Patricia Renou
Thème / Subject Coopération verticale en R&D, Recherche jointe, Incertitude, Hasard Moral, Déviation, Partage de coût
Titre / title Incertitude et Coopération Verticale en R&D
Co-auteurs/Joint work with
Résumé / abstract Cet article a pour but d’enrichir la littérature sur la coopération verticale en R&D (Recherche et Développement). A partir d’un modèle à deux étapes, nous étudions l’impact de la présence d’incertitudes sur la motivation des firmes à investir. L’incertitude porte, dans notre modèle, sur le résultat du programme de recherche et sur l’accueil du consommateur final. Le partage des connaissances entre les firmes, ajouté à une coordination des décisions d’investissement, encourage le succès d’une innovation autant d’un point de vue technologique que commercial. De plus, si les firmes peuvent être tentées de dévier du programme de coopération, leur partenaire ne pouvant vérifier le niveau de leur effort, un partage de l’ensemble des coûts peut les inciter à respecter leur accord.
Lien / download Incertitude et Coopération Verticale en R&D (PDF - 45ko)

  • Mardi 30 mars 2010
Intervenant Taiji Furusawa, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo
Invité par / invited by Antoinette Baujard
Thème / Subject International economics, Non-cooperative game theory
Titre / title Firm Heterogeneity under Financial Imperfection : Impacts of Trade and Capital Movement
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Noriyuki Yanagawa.
Résumé / abstract The paper investigates the role of wealth distributions and financial institutions of an economy on within-industry firm heterogeneity in productivity and on international trade in goods and capital movement. When borrowing is constrained under imperfect financial institution, entrepreneurs with different wealth levels may choose different investment levels, resulting in the firm heterogeneity in productivity. The paper examines the impacts of goods and capital trade between North and South, which differ in their wealth distributions and quality of the financial institution. We find that if the quality of the financial institution is significantly better in North than in South, capital flight from South occurs when only capital is allowed to move internationally. Trade in goods alone will not change the distribution of the firm productivity in the industry. In the case where capital is also allowed to move internationally, however, trade in goods affects the productivity distribution and induces further capital movement. Trade in goods and capital movement are complements in this intriguing sense.
Lien / download furusawa-yanagawa.pdf (PDF - 232 Ko)

  • Vendredi 26 mars 2010
Intervenant Takashi Ui, Yokohama University
Invité par / invited by Antoinette Baujard
Thème / Subject Cooperative game theory
Titre / title The Myerson Value for Complete Coalition Systems
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Hiroyuki Kojima, Department of Economics, Teikyo University ; Atsushi Kajii, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Résumé / abstract In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition systems as collections of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition system has the property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable systems, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition systems. As an allocation rule on complete coalition systems, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value and provides an axiomatization for it. The extended Myerson value coincides with the Myerson value over the union stable systems, but it also assigns payoff vectors to complete coalition systems which are not union stable systems. Thus, the extended Myerson value provides one method of more refined assignments of payoff vectors than the Myerson value.
Lien / download Paper : netgame.pdf
Lien / download Mathematical foundations

  • Lundi 22 mars 2010

Assemblée générale du CREM CAEN


  • Lundi 8 mars 2010
Intervenant Roy Turik, Erasmus University, Roterdam
Invité par / invited by Jean Bonnet
Thème / Subject Entrepreneurship
Titre / title Entrepreneurship and business cycle
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Nicolas Houy, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique.
Résumé / abstract new empirical regularity is established about the business cycle in a cross-country panel of 22 OECD countries for the period 1972-2007 : Entrepreneurship is a leading indicator of the cycle in a Granger causality sense. This concept contradicts existing theoretical hypotheses that predict that entrepreneurship is pro-cyclical or not cyclical. We discuss possible causes and intriguing implications of this finding.
Lien / download Entrepreneurship and business cycle

  • Lundi 1er mars 2010
Intervenant Agnieszka Rusinowska,Université Lyon 2, GATE et CNRS
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Coalitions and networks
Titre / title A model of influence with a continuum of actions
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Michel Grabisch, Université Paris 1, CES
Résumé / abstract In the paper, we generalize a two-action (yes-no) model of influence to a framework in which every player has a continuum of actions and he has to choose one of them. We assume the set of actions to be an interval. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to influence among players, the final decision of a player, i.e., his choice of one action, may be different from his original inclination. In particular, a coalition of players with the same inclination may influence another player with different inclination, and as a result of this influence, the decision of the player is closer to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was. We introduce and study a measure of such a positive influence of a coalition on a player. There is the equivalence between the influence index of a coalition on a player in a social network and the analogous influence index in a corresponding network in which the coalition in question is treated as one player. Several unanimous influence functions in this generalized framework are considered. Moreover, we investigate other tools for analyzing influence, like the concept of a follower of a given coalition, its particular case - a perfect follower, and the kernel of an influence function. We study properties of these concepts. Also the set of fixed points under a given influence function is analyzed. Furthermore, we study linear influence functions. We also introduce a measure of a negative influence of a coalition on a player.
Lien / download A model of influence with a continuum of actions (PDF - 275ko)

  • Lundi 15 février 2010
Intervenant Feng Zhang, doctorante au CREM
Invité par / invited by Maurice Salles
Thème / Subject Théorie du choix social
Titre / title Rights revisited, and limited
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Maurice Salles
Résumé / abstract One of the most justly famous results of social choice theory is Sen’s Theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. In two recent papers, Salles introduced the notion of limited rights both in an aggregation function framework and in a social choice function framework. He then proved Sen-type impossibility theorems. In the aggregation function framework an individual has a `right’ if whenever she prefers an option (social state), say a, to another social state, say b, the soc ial preference ranks a before b. Salles proposed to consider the following weakening. Rather than a being socially ranked before b, he suggests that b should not be ranked before a. The social choice framework is a framework which was introduced later than the aggregation function framework, but is thought to be more or less equivalent it. In this framework, if the individual prefers a to b, then b must not be chosen from any set to which a belongs. Salles’s weakening amounts to say that if it happens that b be chosen, then a must be chosen too. In the present paper, we will describe from an intuitive point of view the technical results obtained by Salles in the light of the distinction between possibility and obligation, and we will present a research program based on the use of tools borrowed from modal logic.
Lien / download Rights-revisited-limited.pdf

  • Lundi 8 février 2010

Réunion CREM des doctorants


  • Lundi 1er février 2010
Intervenant Francis Bloch, Ecole Polytechnique
Invité par / invited by Fabrice Valognes
Thème / Subject Networks
Titre / title Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Nicolas Houy, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique.
Résumé / abstract This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of agents who live for two periods. The optimal assignment rule is stationary, favors old agents and is determined by a selectivity function which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distributions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. The paper also characterizes optimal assignment rules when monetary transfers are allowed and agents face a recovery cost, when agents’ types are private information and when agents can invest to improve their type.
Lien / download Optimal-assignment.pdf

  • Lundi 25 janvier 2010, 15h
Intervenant Sylvain Béal, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne
Invité par / invited by Jean-Pascal Guironnet
Thème / Subject Cooperative game theory
Titre / title Compensations in the Shapley value and a generalization for graph games
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Philippe Solal, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne et GATE Eric Rémila, Université de Lyon, LIP, CNRS, E.N.S. Lyon and IXXI France
Résumé / abstract We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations : each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belongs to. We give an interpretation in terms of formation of the grand coalition according to an ordering of the players and define the corresponding compensation vector. Then, we generalize this idea to cooperative games with a communication graph. Firstly, we consider forest graphs and extend the compensation vector by considering all rooted spanning trees of the graph (Demange, 2004) instead of orderings of the players. The associated allocation rule, called the compensation solution, is characterized by component efficiency and relative fairness. The latter axiom takes into account the relative position of a player with respect to his component. Secondly, we consider arbitrary graphs and construct rooted spanning trees by using the classical algorithms DFS and BFS. If the graph is complete, we show that the compensation solutions associated with DFS and BFS coincide with the Shapley value and the equal surplus division respectively.
Lien / download 10_01_25_Beal_shapley.pdf

  • Lundi 25 janvier 2010
Intervenant Philippe Solal, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne
Invité par / invited by Jean-Pascal Guironnet
Thème / Subject Cooperative game theory
Titre / title Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Richard Baron, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne, Sylvain Béal, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne, Eric Rémila, Université de Lyon, LIP, CNRS, E.N.S. Lyon and IXXI, France
Résumé / abstract We consider communication situations games being the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph. We study the average tree (AT) solutions introduced by Herings et al. [2008a] and [2008b]. The AT solutions are defined with respect to a set, say T, of rooted spanning trees of the communication graph. We characterize these solutions by efficiency, linearity and an axiom of T-hierarchy. Then we prove the following results. Firstly, the AT solution with respect to T is a Harsanyi solution if and only if T is a subset of the set of trees introduced in Herings et al. [2008b]. Secondly, the latter set is constructed by the classical DFS algorithm and the associated AT solution coincides with the Shapley value when the communication graph is complete. Thirdly, the AT solution with respect to trees constructed by the other classical algorithm BFS yields the equal surplus division when the communication graph is complete.
Lien / download MPRA_paper_17909.pdf

  • Lundi 18 janvier 2010
Intervenant Jean-Pascal Guironnet, Université de Caen,
Invité par / invited by
Thème / Subject Econométrie appliquée
Titre / title Frontières de production et modèles de censure : quels apports dans la mesure de la productivité ?
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Corinne Autant-Bernar, Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne ; Nadine Massard Université Jean Monnet, Saint Etienne
Résumé / abstract This paper investigates the effect of inter-firm and intra-firm spillovers on the productivity of firms, using French data. The Luenberger Productivity Indicator (LPI) is used to estimate the productivity and to break it down into several components (e.g. efficiency, biased technical progress, scale effects, etc.). Using this approach, negative productivity changes are found due to the unfavourable economic situation over 2000-2002. Intangible assets of productivity change are then investigated through a Maximum Likelihood Random Effect (MLRE) model. Spillover effects – influencing Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and its correspondent components, technological and efficiency changes – are found.

  • Séminaire du Lundi 11 janvier 2010
Intervenant Jean-François Caulier, Cerec, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, et Université de Caen
Invité par / invited by Fabrice Valognes
Thème / Subject Networks, coalition structures, externalities
Titre / title Coalitional Network Games
Co-auteurs/Joint work with Ana Mauleon, FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles ; Vincent Vannetelbosch, FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain
Résumé / abstract Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players (the society) organized into a network and a coalition structure. The network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with the other individuals and the coalition structure specifies a collection of groups among the society. Coalitional network games model situations where the total productive value of a network among players depends on the players’ group membership. These games thus capture the public good aspect of bilateral cooperation, i.e., network games with externalities. After studying the specific structure of coalitional networks, we propose an allocation rule under the perspective that players can alter the coalitional network structure. This means that the value of all potential alternative coalitional networks can and should influence the allocation of value among players in any given coalitional network structure.
Lien / download Coalitional Network Games