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Accueil > Séminaires réguliers > Séminaires Caen > Archives

2015-2016

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Les séminaires du CREM à Caen ont lieu habituellement salle des Actes de la MRSH
Place de l’Esplanade, à Caen
le lundi à partir de 14h15

 

 

 


  • lundi 13 juin 2016 , 13h30 à 15h30 - Séminaire des doctorants
13h30 -14h30 Yongying Wang - CREM, Unicaen, UFR SEGGAT
Titre Structure de Gouvernance et mode de financement de l’entreprise en thèorie de l’Oligopole
Direction Nicolas Le Pape
Discutants TBA
13h30 -14h30 Aberrahmane Ould Mohamed Ahmedou - CREM, Unicaen, UFR SEGGAT
Titre Théorie des jeux et Economie Industrielle
Direction Abderrahmane Ziad
Discutants TBA

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  • lundi 6 juin 2016 - Séminaire des doctorants
13h30 -14h30 Rabbab Belayadi - CREM, Unicaen, UFR SEGGAT
Titre Concurrence fiscale avec marché du travail : le cas du salaire exogène
Direction Abderrahmane Ziad et Frédéric Gavrel
Discutants Isabelle Lebon et Vincent Merlin
14h30 -15h30 Faty Top - CREM, Unicaen, UFR SEGGAT
Titre L’unimodalité des préférences peut-elle atténuer la vulnérabilité des règles de scores à deux tours face aux paradoxes de participation ?
Direction Vincent Merlin
Discutants Sébastien Courtin et Boniface Mbih
16h-17h Mohamed El Moctar Ellah Tahe - CREM, Unicaen, UFR SEGGAT
Titre Contribution de la santé à la croissance économique : le cas de la Mauritanie
Direction Isabelle Lebon
Discutants Olivier Dagnélie et Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte

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  • lundi 23 mai 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Wilfried Sand-Zantman - TSE
Invité par / Inveted by / title Sara Biancini
Titre / title The value of personal information in markets with endogenous privacy
Co-auteur/Joint work with Rodrigo Montesy and Tommaso Valletti
Résumé / abstract We investigate the Effects of price discrimination on prices, profits, and consumer surplus when at least one competing firm can use consumers’ private information to price discriminate yet consumers can prevent this by paying a « privacy cost ». Unlike a monopolist, competing duopolists do not always benefit from higher privacy costs because each firm’s profit decreases while consumer surplus increases with the privacy cost. We also show that, under such competition, the optimal strategy for an owner of consumer data is selling to only one firm, thereby maximizing the stakes for rival buyers. We argue that the resulting inefficiencies imply that policy makers should devote more attention to discouraging exclusivity deals and less to ensuring that consumers can easily protect their privacy.
Lien/Download 16-05-23_Sand-Zantman_privacyDecember2015.pdf

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  • lundi 9 mai 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Arnaud Lefranc - THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Invité par / Inveted by / title Sara Biancini
Titre / title Equalization of opportunity : Definitions, implementable conditions and application to early-childhood policy evaluation
Co-auteur/Joint work with Francesco Andreolia and Tarjei Havnes
Résumé / abstract This paper develops a criterion to assess equalization of opportunity that is consistent with theoretical views of equality of opportunity. We characterize inequality of oppor-tunity as a situation where some groups in society enjoy an illegitimate advantage. In this context, equalization of opportunity requires that the extent of the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by the privileged groups falls. Robustness requires that this judge-ment be supported by the broadest class of individual preferences. We formalize this criterion in a decision theoretic framework, and derive an empirical condition for equal-ization of opportunity based on observed opportunity distributions. The criterion is used to assess the effectiveness of child care at equalizing opportunity among children, using quantile treatment effects estimates of a major child care reform in Norway. Overall, we find that the child care reform significantly equalized opportunity among Norwegian children.
Lien/Download 16-05-09_AndreoliHavnesLefranc_Norway_22.pdf

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  • lundi 2 mai 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Gauthier Vermandel - Unversité paris Dauphine
Titre / title Climate shocks and business cycles
Co-auteur/Joint work with Ewen Gallic
Résumé / abstract This paper evaluates the macroeconomic effects of climate shocks on the business cycles of a small open economy. We first estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregressive model (BSVAR) to serve as a guideline in developing and estimating a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for New Zealand. Our sample is composed of 11 times series and spans the period from 1987:Q2 to 2014:Q2. The DSGE model captures key features of the agriculture production and fairly replicates the empirical facts displayed by the VAR-type model : a climate shock as measured by a drought index significantly depresses both gross domestic product and agricultural output and is accompanied by a lagged inflation pressure. We find that only large climate shocks, such as ex-treme drought events, generate important macroeconomic fluctuations. Finally using a welfare analysis, we also find that climate fluctuations entail relatively small welfare costs. However, our projections at the end of the century reveal that welfare costs generated by climate shocks are expected to increase between 16% and 20% depending on the climate change scenario considered.
Lien/Download 16-05-02_Gallic_Vermandel.pdf

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  • lundi 2 mai 2016 , 10h à 12h, Salle des Actes de la MRSH - 2e séminaire Économie/Géographie
    Thème éducation, travail et territoire
Intervenants G. Boudesseul, P. Caro, Y. Grelet, L. Minassian, C. Vivent (Céreq ESO-Caen)
Titre / title Les risques localisés de décrochage scolaire en période de crise ;
Intervenant Jean-Pascal Guironnet - CREM
Titre / title Les premiers pas vers l’emploi des diplômés du supérieur : vers une segmentation du dynamisme régional ?

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  • lundi 25 avril 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Petros G. Sekeris - University of Portsmouth
Invité par / Inveted by / title Olivier Dagnelie
Titre / title Can Violence Harm Cooperation ? Experimental Evidence
Co-auteur/Joint work with Giacomo De Luca and Dominic E. Spengler
Résumé / abstract While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation at equi-librium, the possibility of appropriating violently the resource can destroy the incentives to cooperate, because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted. This paper provides ex-perimental evidence that individuals behave according to the theoretical predictions. For high stocks of resources, when conflict is a costly activity, participants cooperate less than in the control group, and play non-cooperatively with higher frequency. This comes as a consequence of the anticipation that, when resources run low, the conflict option is used by a large share of participants.
Lien/Download 16-04-25_Sekeris_DSS_JPubE-1.pdf

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  • lundi 21 mars 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Joern Block - Université de Trier
Invité par / Inveted by / title Jean Bonnet
Titre / title Part-time and hybrid entrepreneurship : a summary of empirical evidence
Résumé / abstract Part-time entrepreneurship has become more important over the last years. So far, however, most entrepreneurship research has neglected this new form of entrepreneurship. The presentation shows the results of two empirical investigations about the drivers and consequences of part-time entrepreneurship on an individual and country-level.

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  • lundi 14 mars 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Bertrand Tchancho - École Normale Supérieure de Yaoundé
Invité par / Inveted by / title Sébastien Courtin
Titre / title Some basic axioms for farsightedness in interactive social environments
Résumé / abstract We introduce a model of prudence in an interactive decision-making environment under complete information. A rationality concept is said to be prudent if it never leads to regret in the worst-case scenario ; that is, if the benefit of any action that it recommends cannot lower that the minimum payoff that its initiator will obtain if he does not take that action. This notion of prudence is an ordinal model of ambiguity aversion, and it offers a worst-case test of rationality in static and sequential games. We subsequently test nine leading concepts of (farsighted) rationality in such games, and find that none passes our prudence test, which suggests that these concepts can be viewed as models of bounded rationality. We define a rationality concept and we show that it is the unique rationality that is prudent and that satisfies some further requirements such as common rationality, anticipation and preemptory deviation properties

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  • lundi 7 mars 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Stéphane Zuber - Paris School of Economics - CNRS
Titre / title Mortality risk, preference diversity and the fair allocation of consumption
Co-auteur/Joint work with M. Fleurbaey et G. Ponthière

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  • lundi 29 février 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Clémence Christin - CREM CNRS, Université Caen Normandie
Titre / title New Product Introduction and Slotting Fees
Co-auteur/Joint work with Claire Chambolle
Résumé / abstract The availability of a product in a given store is a form of informational advertising that may go beyond the store itself. We show that each retailer is able to extract a rent in exchange for this “informational advertising” service, which materializes through the payment of a slotting fee from the producer to the retailer. Therefore, a manufacturer may not find profitable to innovate in order to launch a new and more efficient product. This in turn harms consumers surplus and welfare. Varying the buyer size, we then show that retail concentration may facilitate innovation.
Lien/Download 16-02-29_Christin-Chambolle.pdf

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  • lundi 22 février 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Saïd Souam - Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense
Invité par / Inveted by / title Abderrahmane Ziad
Titre / title Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power
Co-auteur/Joint work with Patricia Charléty et Marie-Cécile Fagart
Résumé / abstract This paper completely characterizes the equilibria of a costly vot-ing game where shareholders of a …rm strategically vote for or against a proposed resolution, or withhold. It is shown that a minimum quorum creates an incentive to form voting coalitions in favor of the resolu-tion. Equilibria in favor of the resolution and against it may co-exist. A high minimum quorum favors the occurrence of (1) equilibria where coalitions of small partisans of the proposed resolution vote and the resolution is adopted (2) an equilibrium against where no shareholder votes. The size of the large shareholders (in favor or against the reso-lution) does play a crucial role concerning the existence of equilibria, their type, the size and the number of voters. Finally, we provide a precise content to the concepts of dominant, controlling and refer-ence shareholder and discuss the situations where shareholders control, completely, partially or jointly, general meetings.
Lien/Download 16-02-22_Charlety-Fagart-Souam.pdf

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  • lundi 1 février 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Shon Ferguson - Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Invité par / Inveted by / title Abderrahmane Ziad
Titre / title Offshoring, Total Factor Productivity and SkillBiased Technological Change
Co-auteur/Joint work with Zhanar Akhmetova
Résumé / abstract The paper answers two questions simultaneously. What is the effect of offshoring on firms’ total factor productivity ? What is the effect of offshoring on skill-biased technological change ? We estimate a model of firm production that al-lows for the effect of offshoring on both total factor productivity and relative skilled labor productivity, and for spillovers between the two. The model is fitted to Swedish firm-level data between 2001-2011. We find positive effects of offshoring intensity on total factor productivity, particularly of small domestic firms and large foreign-owned firms, and on skill-biased technological change in production of firms with low off-shoring intensity. Initiating offshoring results in skill-biased technological change in non-production activities of large domestic firms. We show that evaluating the impact of offshoring in a unified framework has implications for the estimation results.
Lien/Download 16-02-01_shon-Akhmetova.pdf

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  • lundi 25 janvier 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Assemblée générale - Site de Caen

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  • lundi 18 janvier 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Yvonne Marczok - doctorante à l’université de Duisburg-Essen
Titre / title Impact of incentive oriented blended learning on students’ learning behavior and outcomes
Résumé / abstract This paper focuses on a blended learning approach implemented in university courses with the aim to improve learning performance and outcomes. In addition to the created online learning opportunities, an incentive based approach aims to promote student engagement in courses. Due to this incentive based blended learning concept the learning process becomes more effective and successful. Moreover, students’ motivation to deal with the teaching material rises. Consequently, the lack of preparation which often results in poor student performance diminishes. For this purpose the concept of learning by doing is introduced to university courses supported by incentive oriented blended learning. Thus exam outcomes are mainly the result of skills, which rise in solving exercises and spending learning time. Dynamic maximization of utility considering the choice between learning time and leisure time is performed. Depending on preferences for leisure time, learning performance varies. As a result, utility is maximized by constant learning over time rather than by last minute learning. Thus this paper emphasizes the importance of the interplay of incentives to learn, e-learning opportunities and face-to-face-sessions in regard to better learning behavior and outcomes.

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  • lundi 11 janvier 2016 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Sébastien Courtin - CREM CNRS, Université Caen Normandie
Invité par / Invited by Séminaire interne
Titre / title Dichotomous multi-type Games with a Coalition structure
Co-auteur/Joint work with Zéphirin Nganmeni et Bertrand Tchantcho
Résumé / abstract This work focuses on the evaluation of the voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure (DMGCs). Dichotomous multi-type games have been introduced by Courtin et al. [2015] in order to generalize simple game. They modelize game in which there are a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is accepted or rejected. In game with a coalition structure it is supposed that players organize themselves into a priori disjoint coalitions. We extend the well known Owen-Shapley index (Owen [1977]) and Owen-Banzhaf index (Owen [1981]) to DMGCs. A full characterization of these power indices are provided.

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  • lundi 7 décembre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Olivier Dagnelie - CREM, UFR SEGGAT, Université Caen Normandie
Invité par / Invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Thema Enchères, économie expérimentale
Titre / title Do Girls Pay the Price of Civil War ? Violence and Infant Mortality in Congo
Co-auteur/Joint work with Giacomo De Luca et Jean-François Maystadt
Résumé / abstract This paper documents the impact of civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo on infant mortality between 1997 and 2004. It adopts an instrumental variable approach to correct for the non-random timing and location of conflict and its likely correlation to our dependent variable. Strong and robust evidence, including mother fixed effects regressions, shows that conflict significantly increases girl mortality. It also examines the mechanisms explaining this phenomenon, with a focus on disentangling the behavioral from the biological factors. The analysis suggests that gender imbalances in infant mortality are driven by the selection induced by a higher vulnerability of boys in utero rather than by gender discrimination.
Lien/Download 15-12-07_Dagnelie.pdf

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  • lundi 30 novembre 2015 , 13h30 à 15h30 Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Séminaire commun éco-géo
Thème / Thema Les modes de coopérations entre organisations publiques : collectivités et établissements publics de coopérations interterritoriales.
Intervenant Zined Abidi - Doctorant CREM, UFR SEGGAT
Titre / title Coopérations fiscales : zoom sur les déterminants de coopération entre communes en Bretagne (30 minutes)
Intervenant Sabrina Jacqueline - EM Normandie Caen
Titre / title Coopérations économiques : zoom sur l’outil Pôle métropolitain et l’exemple de Caen Normandie Métropole (30 minutes).
Résumé / abstract What is the optimal disclosure policy of a seller in a repeated auction ? When identical and common value items are auctioned sequentially, information about the outcome of the elapsed auctions, like the winner’s bid, changes how the bidders value next item and could impact their bidding strategy. We analyse this issue in a twice repeated common value auction, both in theory and in the lab. We show that when the winning bid is disclosed at the end of the first auction, any symmetric equilibrium of the game necessarily involves some bunching at the top : the strategy profiles in the first auction are flat for bidders that receive the highest signals about the value of the object. However, the impact of that information disclosure on the seller’s profit cannot be assessed analytically. Therefore, we turn to the lab. We observe that the seller’s profit decreases with disclosure of the winning bid compared to the case where no information is disclosed at the end of the first auction. The main reason is that bidders decrease drastically their bids in the first auction when they know that the winning bid will be revealed : an anticipation effect. Moreover and as predicted by theory, bunching occurs for high value signals.

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  • lundi 23 novembre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45 - Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Intervenant Nicolas Jacquemet - PSE, CES, Université Paris 1
Invité par / Inveted by / title Sara Biancini
Thème / Thema Enchères, économie expérimentale
Titre / title Information Disclosure in Common Value Repeated Auctions
Co-auteur/Joint work with Vianney Dequiedt and Stéphane Robin
Résumé / abstract What is the optimal disclosure policy of a seller in a repeated auction ? When identical and common value items are auctioned sequentially, information about the outcome of the elapsed auctions, like the winner’s bid, changes how the bidders value next item and could impact their bidding strategy. We analyse this issue in a twice repeated common value auction, both in theory and in the lab. We show that when the winning bid is disclosed at the end of the first auction, any symmetric equilibrium of the game necessarily involves some bunching at the top : the strategy profiles in the first auction are flat for bidders that receive the highest signals about the value of the object. However, the impact of that information disclosure on the seller’s profit cannot be assessed analytically. Therefore, we turn to the lab. We observe that the seller’s profit decreases with disclosure of the winning bid compared to the case where no information is disclosed at the end of the first auction. The main reason is that bidders decrease drastically their bids in the first auction when they know that the winning bid will be revealed : an anticipation effect. Moreover and as predicted by theory, bunching occurs for high value signals.

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  • lundi 16 novembre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45 Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Intervenant Nicolas Le Pape - CREM CNRS, Université Caen Normandie
Invité par / Inveted by / title Séminaire interne
Thème / Thema Economie du sport
Titre / title Increasing Downside or Outer Risk ? The Challenge of Measuring Competitive Imbalance in Closed and Open Leagues.
Co-auteur/Joint work with Jean-Pascal Gayant
Résumé / abstract In two seminal papers, Menezes et al. (1980) and Menezes and Wang (2005) have defined the concepts of increases in downside and in outer risk. Such notions are useful to give intrinsic characterizations of the notions of prudence and temperance. In this paper, we explore a new application about higher-order risk preferences : the measurement of competitive imbalance in sports leagues. We show that a desirable property for the measurement of imbalance is the inclination to any increase in downside risk in the context of closed leagues, and the aversion to any increase in outer risk in the context of open leagues.

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  • lundi 9 novembre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45 Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Intervenant Vincenzo Verardi - CRED-UNamur, ULB
Invité par / Inveted by / title Olivier Dagnelie
Thème / Thema Economie du sport
Titre / title « Will all Blossoms Bloom ? International Competitive Balance, Convergence and Selection in Rugby »
Co-auteur/Joint work with Brian O’Rourke
Résumé / abstract The global Rugby Union community was rocked on 19th September 2015. Japan’s national team – the “Brave Blossoms”, narrowly beat South Africa, a historic dynastic power in the sport. This re-kindled an old and vital policy debate in a sport that has been long characterized by imbalanced competition between dynasties and weaker teams. Sports economics theory was founded on the notion that fans prefer « uncertainty of outcome » or unpredictability of results, which in turn is derived from having competitive balance between teams. Was competitive balance finally being achieved in rugby ? Competitive balance implies convergence between teams in output terms. Were there any signs of convergence in rugby union ? If so, that would in turn indicate greater competitive balance, which we assume to be a desirable policy outcome.  We based our analysis on an Elo-type international rankings model.  Our convergence test, based on semiparametric estimations and quantiles regression with sample selection, was to see if distant conditional quantiles get closer over time. We then performed some intervention analysis to understand if a set of policies adopted to facilitate convergence worked (such as the creation of regional competitions, or the integration of additional teams in high-level competitions such as the six-nations tournament or the rugby championship). Even if some policies seem to work, there is no sign of global convergence in Rugby Union. The sport remains dynastic, as the recent World Cup Final held between two dynasties in New Zealand and Australia would indicate.

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  • lundi 12 octobre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45 Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Intervenant Antonin Macé - CNRS, Aix-Marseille School of Economics
Invité par / Inveted by / title Vincent Merlin
Thème / Thema Vote
Titre / title Fairness and Storable Votes : the Tale of Blotto’s Lieutenants
Co-auteur/Joint work with Alessandra Casella et Jean-François Laslier
Résumé / abstract In a polarized world, majoritarian democracy gives no voice to the minority. Storable Votes—a voting scheme that allows voters to combine multiple votes on a single issue, subject to a total allotment of votes—makes it possible for the minority to win occasionally, while preserving anonymity and preventing obstruction. Existing analyses of Storable Votes assume that voters assign cardinal values to the different issues and have accurate beliefs about the stochastic properties of the value distribution (shape and support, correlations across issues and voters). Such assumptions can simplify the analysis of the game and induce intuitive coordination in voting in experimental settings. But with high uncertainty and ignorance, voters may be unable to rank the importance of different issues or form expectations about others’ values. Do Storable Votes still protect the minority ? Formally, the game becomes a decentralized Colonel Blotto game, in which troops (here, votes) are distributed across battlefields (issues) not by the two opposing commanders (single leaders of the two subgroups), but by their lieutenants (individual voters, belonging to the majority or to the minority), with or without communication. The game with communication can replicate the equilibria of the centralized Blotto game, but to our knowledge no results exist on the decentralized game (without communication). We study it in the theoretical part of the paper, and establish two main results. If the relative size of the minority is not too small : (1) The expected fraction of minority victories is positive in all Nash equilibria of the game. (2) It is positive for any strategy followed by the majority as long as each minority voter concentrates his votes on a sufficiently small fraction of issues, chosen randomly. We test the theory in a laboratory experiment, focusing in particular on a set of simple symmetric equilibrium strategies. With or without communication, we find that experimental subjects deviate from such strategies, and yet the fraction of minority victories we observe is close to the theory. As suggested by our second result above, minority victories occur because minority voters almost unanimously concentrate their votes and randomize. The implication is that the voting rule is robust to strategic mistakes, as long as minority voters follow what seems, from our subjects, a rather natural behavioral rule.

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  • lundi 5 octobre 2015 , 14h15 à 15h45 Salle des Actes de la MRSH
Intervenant François-Régis Mahieu - CNRS, Aix-Marseille School of Economics
Invité par / Inveted by / title Muriel Gilardone
Thème / Thema Histoire de la pensée économique
Titre / title Une analyse économique de la responsabilité est-elle possible ?

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