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Accueil > Séminaires réguliers > Séminaires Caen > Archives

2013-2014

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Les séminaires du CREM à Caen ont lieu salle IT002
de l’UFR Sciences Economiques et de Gestion de Caen, 19 rue Claude Bloch,
le lundi à partir de 14h

 

  • Responsables séminaires : Clémence Christin et Vincent Merlin.

 

  • lundi 30 juin 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Hadrien Gouze - PHARE, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Invité par / invited by Muriel Gilardone
Thème / Subject Théories économiques de la justice
Titre / title L’optimalité en termes de liberté : analyse et enjeux
Résumé / abstract 30_Gouze_abstract.pdf
Lien / download 30_Gouze.pdf

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  • lundi 23 juin 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Robert Owen - Université Paris 1
Invité par / invited by
Titre / title Rethinking the Evolutionary Foundations of Economics and Finance

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  • lundi 16 juin 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45 - ANNULÉ
Intervenant Abderrahmane Ould Mohamed Ahmedou - Doctorant du CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie

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  • lundi 2 juin 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Guy Meunier - INRA-ALISS
Invité par / invited by Clémence Christin
Thème / Subject Economie industrielle
Titre / title Risk Aversion and technology portfolios
Résumé / abstract This paper analyzes the choice of a technology portfolio by risk averse firms. Two technologies with random marginal costs are available to produce a homogeneous good. If the risks associated with the technologies are correlated, then the firms might invest in a technology with a negative expected return or, conversely, might not invest in a technology with a positive expected return. If the technology with the lower expected cost is riskier than the other technology, then this \low-cost" technology will be eliminated from the firm’s portfolio if the risks are highly correlated. With imperfect competition, the portfolios of firms are different, and the di-erence in risk tolerance can explain the full specialization of the industry : the less risk averse firms use the low-cost technology, and the more risk averse firms use the less risky, higher cost technology.
Lien / download 14-06-02_Meunier.pdf

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  • lundi 26 mai 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Rafael Treibich - Ecole Polytechnique, Département d’Economie
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Public choice
Titre / title Welfare Egalitarianism with Other-Regarding Preferences
Résumé / abstract We study the fair allocation of a one dimensional and perfectly divisible good (money) when individuals have other-regarding preferences. A social ordering function associates any profi-le of ordinal preference relations with a complete ordering of all possible allocations. In both a model of average and positional externalities, we characterize a class of social ordering functions which satisfy appealing effi ciency, fairness and consistency properties. These rankings require giving full priority to the worst off agent in the economy, where individual welfare is measured by the quantity which would make the individual indi fferent to the allocation where everyone consumes the same.
Lien / download 14-05-26_Treibich.pdf

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  • lundi 19 mai 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Bernard Grofman - University of California, Irvine
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Public choice
Titre / title Aspiration Models of Committee Decision Making
Co-auteur/Joint work with Joseph Godfrey - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Résumé / abstract We study competition in capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading. To restrict entrepreneurs’ ability to trade with counterparties, investors design financial contracts including covenants. Without covenants, investors earn positive rents at equilibrium which are equal to the monopoly profit if moral hazard is severe. With covenants, market equilibria are indeterminate and Pareto ranked. Contrary to common wisdom, covenants do not enhance competition. We next evaluate the competitive effect of two different regulatory devices centered on market transparency. 
Lien / download 2014-05-22_Grofman-Godfrey.pdf

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  • lundi 12 mai 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Andrea Attar - TSE
Invité par / invited by Sara Biancini
Titre / title Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Debt Covenants
Résumé / abstract We study competition in capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading. To restrict entrepreneurs’ ability to trade with counterparties, investors design financial contracts including covenants. Without covenants, investors earn positive rents at equilibrium which are equal to the monopoly profit if moral hazard is severe. With covenants, market equilibria are indeterminate and Pareto ranked. Contrary to common wisdom, covenants do not enhance competition. We next evaluate the competitive effect of two different regulatory devices centered on market transparency. 

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  • lundi 14 avril 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant ANNULE - Université Lyon III

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  • lundi 7 avril 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Olivier Tercieux - CNRS, PSE
Daniel Danau
Titre / title Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
Y.K. Che - Columbia University
Résumé / abstract We study efficient and stable mechanisms in many-to-one matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals’ preferences are drawn randomly from a class of distributions allowing for both common value and idiosyncratic components. In this context, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms (including top trading cycles, serial dictatorship, and their randomized variants) generate total payoffs that converge to the utilitarian upper bound. This result implies that Pareto-efficient mechanisms are asymptotically payoff equivalent in the population distribution sense --- that is, ``up to the renaming of agents.’’ If objects’ priorities are also randomly drawn but agents’ common values for objects are heterogenous, then well-known mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycle mechanisms fail either efficiency or stability even in the asymptotic sense. We propose a new mechanism that is asymptotically efficient, asymptotically stable and incentive compatible.

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  • lundi 31 mars 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Daniel Krähmer - University Bonn, Department of Economics
Invité par / invited by Daniel Danau
Titre / title Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Co-auteur/Joint work with Roland Strausz - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Résumé / abstract We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.
Lien / download Ex post information rents in sequential screening

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  • lundi 24 mars 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Claude Diebolt - BETA, Université de Strasbourg
Invité par / invited by Jean-Pascal Guironnet
Thème / Subject Cliométrie
Titre / title Allocation of Talents and Career Paths in the Long Run
Résumé / abstract In the late 19th century, the hypothesis was put forward, that a glutting was manipulated and augmented by the conservative Prussian government to prevent members of the lower social classes from studying and to restore the social exclusivity of the Prussian Universities. This crisis had a large impact on the public discussion surrounding academic education and culminated in references to a growing « academic proletariat ». During a great debate in parliament the Prussian minister of culture —Gustav von Goßler— asked, with the acclamation of the conservatives : How many students are necessary to maintain the size of the governing classes ? A secret prognosis of student enrolments, which had been made by Wilhelm Lexis, was used to successfully push through political measures designed to diminish student populations. But all these efforts were unsuccessful and after a short cyclical recession, student populations grew at a much faster rate than they had beforehand. It became rapidly clear that the dynamic of the process that led to glutting was probably independent of political influences. Further, the hypothesis that the glutting crisis was manipulated by particular interest groups could not be sustained (Titze, 1990, Müller-Benedict, 1991, 2000). This paper seeks precisely to develop new investigations into the nature of the generated dynamics in the German and especially Prussian higher education system, i.e. to formulate an original modeling of the labor market for academics in Prussia before World War II using an original triple database. The data, together with other information such as age, sex, social origin of the students, education finance, etc. has been published in three books (Titze et al., 1987, 1995, Diebolt, 1997). The article represents an extension of the seminal work of Freeman (1971) and a publication by Ehrenberg & Smith (1994) who, in Chapter 9 of their book entitled Modern Labor Economics, present an original treatment of cobweb models in labour economics. A two-fold hypothesis is put forward. Firstly, the behavior of students in their choice of curriculum depends on the expected rewards. Indeed, the allocation of talents to the various faculties depends on the comparative yields of the latter in terms of expected earnings and job availability in the corresponding professional sectors. Thus, the rewards expected by a student are represented by the earnings on the labor market at a given moment and that he or she considers to be sustainable in time. Secondly, an attraction phenomenon may appear for certain curricula when a shortage occurs in different professional sectors. Once the shortage has been made up, the demand effect continues as a result of delay in the perception of the situation by young people. This may gradually lead to comparative over-production of qualified university leavers. This unbalanced situation diverts new cohorts of students to other sectors of education and may cause a new shortage, finally resulting in a cyclical movement modulated according to job availability. The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. In section 3, we define our theoretical model. Econometric tests (regressions, outliers and spectral analysis) using the case of Germany and more precisely Prussia are developed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a central question that arises implicitly for future research and policy makers of the new century : does the revealed historical process continue to generate cycles after World War II and today ?

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  • lundi 17 mars 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Bruno Drouot - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Titre / title A dashboard with biological indicators
Résumé / abstract The number of fishing firms decreased by 45% between 1990 and 2010 (Leblond et al., 2012). In this difficult economic environment, the firms face the depletion of fish stocks, the rising of production costs and decreasing profitability. These firms implement various management tools to improve their performance and to anticipate the risk of failure. The objective of this paper is to highlight that a fishing company needs to define biological indicators for developing growth strategies and prevent difficulties.

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lundi 10 mars 2014, 14h15
Réunion du laboratoire

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  • lundi 24 février 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Clément Dupêcher - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne, doctorant
Thème / Subject Commerce international, modèle de gravité
Titre / title Modélisation de la relation entre flux de commerce bilatéraux et identités politiques

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  • lundi 17 février 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Nicolas Debarsy - Université d’Orléans, CNRS LEO, et CERPE, Université de Namur
Invité par / invited by Jean Bonnet
Thème / Subject Econométrie spatiale
Titre / title Large sample properties of the matrix exponential spatial specification with an application to FDI
Co-auteur/Joint work with Fei JIN School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Co-auteur/Joint work with Lung-fei LEE Department of Economics, the Ohio State University
Résumé / abstract This paper considers the large sample properties of the matrix exponential spatial specification (MESS) and compares its properties with those of the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. We find that the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) for the MESS is consistent under heteroskedasticity, a property not shared by the QMLE of the SAR model. For the MESS in both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic cases, consistency is proved and asymptotic distributions are derived. We also consider properties of the generalized method of moments estimator (GMME). In the homoskedastic case, we derive a best GMME that is as efficient as the maximum likelihood estimator under normality and can be asymptotically more efficient than the QMLE under non-normality. In the heteroskedastic case, an optimal GMME can be more efficient than the QMLE asymptotically and the possible best GMME is also discussed. For the general model that has MESS in both the dependent variable and disturbances, labeled MESS(1,1), the QMLE can be consistent under unknown heteroskedasticity when the spatial weights matrices in the two MESS processes are commutative. Also, properties of the QMLE and GMME for the general model are considered. The QML approach for the MESS model has the computational advantage over that of a SAR model. The computational simplicity carries over to MESS models with any finite order of spatial matrices. No parameter range needs to be imposed in order for the model to be stable. Furthermore, the Delta method is used to derive test statistics for the impacts of exogenous variables on the dependent variable. Results of Monte Carlo experiments for finite sample properties of the estimators are reported. Finally, the MESS(1,1) is applied to Belgium’s outward FDI data and we observe that the dominant motivation of Belgium’s outward FDI lies in finding cheaper factor inputs.
Lien / download Debarsy_Jin_Lee_13.pdf

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  • lundi 10 février 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Aurélien Lamy - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject théories néo-institutionnelles – TPE/PME – Administrations publiques – changement organisationnel – étude de cas
Titre / title Jamais deux sans trois : répondre à la complexité institutionnelle à travers l’intégration d’une nouvelle logique
Résumé / abstract Cette communication s’intéresse à la réponse apportée par des organisations confrontées à la complexité institutionnelle. Elle mobilise la typologie de logiques institutionnelles élaborée par Thornton et al. (2012), afin d’étudier le cas d’un incubateur technologique. Organisation hybride depuis sa création, l’incubateur a oscillé entre logique de service public et logique de marché depuis lors. Cependant, il a aussi intégré une nouvelle logique extérieure au champ de l’incubation technologique. En repositionnant la réponse à la complexité institutionnelle dans un cadre plus large qui intègre le niveau sociétal, notre étude met en évidence l’adaptation continue que permet le processus d’hybridation et la possibilité pour les organisations d’intégrer des logiques extérieur à leur champ. Notre travail contribue ainsi à élargir la compréhension de la réponse organisationnelle à la complexité institutionnelle et plus particulièrement la compréhension du phénomène d’hybridation.
Lien / download 2014-02-10_Lamy.pdf

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  • lundi 3 février 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Olivier Renault - GREQUAM, Université d’Aix Marseille - GAINS, Université du Maine
Invité par / invited by Nicolas Le Pape
Thème / Subject Subjective Discounted Utility, Very Distant Future, Time Tradeoff, Asymptotic Patience, DADI discounting
Titre / title How do People discount the Very Distant Future ? A Theoretical Approach
Co-auteur/Joint work with André Lapied - GREQUAM, Université d’Aix Marseille
Résumé / abstract In this paper, we consider a Decision Maker (DM) facing alternatives defined on very distant future, that is, a time horizon on which delays may exceed the DM’s life-time horizon. Hyperbolic Discounted Utility has been extensively used to describe these decisions since it confers greater importance to very distant future and is less responsive to change in discount rate than Exponential Discounted Utility (HARVEY [1994]). In a recent work, BLEICHRODT, ROHDE and WAKKER (henceforth BRW) [2009] have identified a new time paradox, called Strongly Decreasing Impatience (SDI), applied to Exponential Discounted Utility and to Hyperbolic Discounted Utility. BRW have built a CADI (Constant Absolute Decreasing Impatience) discount function that rationalizes SDI. We show that the SDI paradox is included into a more general time paradox, called “asymptotic patience”, and related to the discounting of the very distant future. In a nutshell, asymptotic patience means that, for very distant future, there is no time tradeoff between alternatives : the DM always prefers the larger outcome to the smaller outcome, even if the former is shifted in a very remote future. The Subjective Discounted Utility (LAPIED and RENAULT [2012]), that generalizes any Discounted Utility model, enables us to define axiomatic conditions for time preferences that are consistent with the absence of time tradeoff and to build an alternative DADI (Decreasing Absolute Decreasing Impatience) discount function that both exhibits time tradeoff for initial time intervals and a zero discount rate for very distant future. The SDU also provides a sharp expression to the very distant future based on psychological distortion of linear time called time perception.
Lien / download 14-02-03_Lapied_Renault.pdf

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  • lundi 27 janvier 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Eric Kamwa - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject Voting Theory - Social Choice
Titre / title Consistency of some scoring rules over subsets of alternatives
Co-auteur/Joint work with Vincent Merlin - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Résumé / abstract We know since the works of Gehrlein and Fishburn (1980, 1981), Fishburn (1981) and Saari (1987, 1988, 1990) that, the collective rankings of scoring rules are not stable when some alternatives are dropped from the set of alternatives. However, in the literature, attention has been mainly devoted to the relationship between pairwise majority vote and scoring rules rankings. In this paper, we focus on the relationships between four-candidate and three-candidate rankings. More precisely, given a collective ranking over a set of four candidates, we determine under the impartial culture condition, the probability of each of the six possible rankings when one candidate is dropped. As a consequence, we derive from our computations, the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections, the Leaving Member paradox (Staring (1986)) and of the PriorSuccessor Paradox which occur when an elected candidate steps down from a two-member committee.
Lien / download

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  • lundi 13 janvier 2014 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Matias Nunez - Thema, Université de Cergy
Intervenant Sébastien Courtin - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Approval voting ; Condorcet winner ; Voting equilibria ; Asymmetric Societies
Titre / title A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes
Résumé / abstract It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this multiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes (the Approval voting method). For scenarios with three candidates, we can hence build a map that associates any preference profile to its set of equilibria outcomes ; this map is very close to the most well-known Tournament solutions.
Lien / download 14-01-13_Courtin_Nunez.pdf

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  • lundi 16 décembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte - CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject Trade Integration, New Trade Flows, Business Cycles, Synchronization, European Monetary Union
Titre / title Trade Integration and Business Cycle Synchronization in the EMU : the Negative Effect of New Trade Flows
Co-auteur/Joint work with Jean-Christophe Poutineau - CREM, Université de Rennes 1
Co-auteur/Joint work with Fabien Rondeau - CREM, Université de Rennes 1
Résumé / abstract This paper questions the impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronization in the EMU by distinguishing increase of existing trade flows (the intensive margin) and creation of new trade flows (the extensive margin). Using a DSGE model, we find that synchronization is weakened when new firms are allowed to export in response to productivity gains. Using disaggregated data over 1995–2007 for the 10 founding members of the EMU and consistently with our model, we find that trade intensity has a positive direct effect while new trade flows have a negative effect on business cycle synchronization. Furthermore, new flows play essentially an indirect role by intensifying specialization and explain 60% of the overall effect of trade intensity and specialization on synchronization.
Lien / download WP 2013-13.pdf

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  • lundi 9 décembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Guy Launoy - Université de Caen, UFR de médecine
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Thème / Subject Inégalités dans l’accès aux soin

  • lundi 2 décembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Serguei Kaniovski - Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Titre / title The Minimum Sum Representation as an Index of Voting Power
Co-auteur/Joint work with Josep Freixas - Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Résumé / abstract We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game. The MSR o-ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox. We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power.
Lien / download 13-12-02_KaniovskiFreixas.pdf

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  • lundi 25 novembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Elsa Orgiazzi - CREM, Université de Rennes 1
Invité par / invited by Isabelle Lebon et Frédéric Chantreuil
Thème / Subject income inequality, factor decomposition, decomposition by population subgroups
Titre / title Factor Components of Inequality : A Cross-Country Study
Co-auteur/Joint work with Cecilia García-Peñalosa - Université d’Aix Marseille (Aix Marseille School of Economics), CNRS et EHESS
Résumé / abstract This paper uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine some of the forces that have driven changes in household income inequality over the last three decades of the 20th century. We decompose inequality for 6 countries (Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US) into the three sources of market income (earnings, property income and income from self-employment) and taxes and transfers. Our findings indicate that although changes in the distribution of earnings are an important force behind recent trends, they are not the only one. Greater earnings dispersion has in some cases been accompanied by a reduction in the share of earnings which dampened its impact on overall household income inequality. In some countries the contribution of self-employment income to inequality has been on the rise, while in others, increases in inequality in capital income account for a substantial fraction of the observed distributional changes.
Lien / download Factor Components of Inequality : A Cross-Country Study

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  • lundi 18 novembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Bourheneddine Ben Dhaou - Doctorant du CREM, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie
Invité par / invited by Séminaire interne
Thème / Subject Jeux coopératifs
Titre / title Résolution des jeux hédoniques sous forme extensive : une analyse stratégique
Lien / download 13_11_18_Ben Dhaou.pdf

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  • lundi 4 novembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Jan Van Hove - University of Leuven, HU Brussels and INFER
Invité par / invited by Sophie Lecostey
Thème / Subject International trade
Titre / title Export Survival, Differentiation and Returning to Exports
Co-auteur/Joint work with Filip Abraham - University of Leuven and Vlerick Business School
Co-auteur/Joint work with Zuzanna Studnicka - University of Leuven
Résumé / abstract Studying a unique data set of Belgian firm level manufacturing exports, and distinguishing between firms, products and destinations, we find that the median and average duration of exports are short. Export survival is positively affected, both in the short and in the long run, by firm size and product and geographic diversification. However, the latter finding is reversed when looking at the exports of specific products to specific markets. In addition, returning to exports increases the probability of export survival. Hence there appears to be a learning effect as firms benefit from their previous experience exporting particular goods or exporting to particular markets. Therefore, the fixed cost of exporting is not sunk, contradicting theoretical assumptions.

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  • lundi 14 octobre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant Emmanuel Peterlé - CREM, Université de Rennes 1
Invité par / invited by Jean-Pascal Guironnet
Titre / title College major choice, occupational segregation and gender wage gap
Résumé / abstract Although women have caught up with men in terms of educational attainment in most industrialized countries, they still largely differ in the content of study. In this paper, we investigate to what extent gender segregation in fields of study affects both gender occupational segregation and gender wage gap. We use therefore French data from the “Enquête Emploi” survey. Our findings suggest that women and men differing in field of study significantly impacts occupational segregation in the labor market. It does not however play a significant role in the gender wage differentials. Our data also shows that gender earnings differential within predominantly female occupations could be largely explained by structural differences in characteristics. This is not the case in predominantly male jobs, suggesting the potential existence of discriminatory practices in these occupations.
Lien / download 13_10_14_Peterle.pdf

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  • lundi 30 septembre 2013 , 14h15 à 15h45
Intervenant William Zwicker - Department of Mathematics, Union College, Schenectady NY, USA
Invité par / invited by Vincent Merlin
Titre / title Condorcet vs Borda, round n+1
Lien / download Abstract

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