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Working papers - documents de travail du Condorcet Center

 

  • Do political parties matter ? Endogenous fragmentation, partisanship, and local public expenditures in Finland
Creation-Date January 2017
Auteur /Author Kristýna DOSTÁLOVÁ - University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, France
Auteur /Author Benoît LE MAUX - CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France
Auteur /Author Antti MOISIO - Finnish Council of Regulatory Impact Analysis
Mots clés / Keywords Political fragmentation, Partisan effects, Local expenditures, Propensity score matching
Classification-JEL : H72, H40, D72
Abstract Both the Weak Government Hypothesis and the Partisan Theory state that institutional settings are sufficiently permissive to allow elected politicians to maximize their own utility at the expense of citizens’ preferences. We test this statement using data on Finnish local public expenditures. One important point is that the composition of the government can be explained by the hetero-geneity of voters’ preferences, hence the need for appropriate techniques to control for a potential selection bias. Using propensity score matching (PSM) methods, we demonstrate that neither the Weak Government Hypothesis nor the Partisan Theory provide an explanation of public spending differences. What appears to be the influence of government composition is in fact shown to be a demand driven process.
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  • Ideology and Public Policies : A Quasi-Experimental Test of the Hypothesis that Left-Wing Governments Spend More
Creation-Date January 2017
Auteur /Author Benoît LE MAUX - CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France
Auteur /Author Kristýna DOSTÁLOVÁ - University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, France
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO - CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France
Mots clés / Keywords Public services, Party ideology, Redistribution, Partisan effects, Selection bias
Classification-JEL : H72, H40, D72
Abstract In the literature it is often argued that governments on the left tend to raise tax rates and public spending more than their right-wing counterparts. We demonstrate that this result must be interpreted with caution. Not only it may reveal partisan effects, due to the direct impact of parties’ ideology on public spending, but also a selection bias, since the distribution of voters’ preferences determines the ideology of the government in office. The present research overcomes this problem of observational equivalence by applying two identification strategies, namely re-gression discontinuity design and propensity score matching. Using data from the French local public sector, we show that governments facing the same economic situation do not spend more when they are left-wing, particularly in the case of social expenditures. This result rules out the partisan-politicians hypothesis and lends support to demand driven policy selection processes.
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  • Cheat or Perish ? A Theory of Scientific Customs
Creation-Date December 2016
Auteur /Author Benoît LE MAUX - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Sarah NECKER - University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland
Auteur /Author Yvon ROCABOY - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Mots clés / Keywords Economics of Science, Contract Theory, Scientific Misbehavior, Social Norms
Classification-JEL : A11, A13, K42
Abstract We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.
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  • Electoral competition and political selection : An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958-2012
Creation-Date September 2016
Auteur /Author Nicolas GAVOILLE - Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia - Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Marijn VERSCHELDE - EISEG School of Management, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, France, and Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Mots clés / Keywords Competition, Election, Political Selection, Kernel Regression, Nonparametric Econometrics
Classification-JEL : D72, J45, C14
Abstract In this paper, we study the relation between electoral competition and po-litical selection, using a unique dataset containing detailed yearly information about members of the French National Assembly from 1958 to 2012. First, we innovate by using activity as a proxy for politicians’ quality. As we gathered information on the many aspects of deputies’ individual work, we use a non-parametric composite indicator of deputy activity that fully acknowledges the multidimensional nature of parliamentary work. Second, we do not impose any assumption about the relationship between electoral competition and political selection by using a fully nonparametric framework. Third, this method allows studying the evolution of the relationship between electoral competition and political selection over time. Overall, our results show that deputies elected in apriori contested districts have a higher overall activity, with the intensity of this relationship reaching its peak in the 80’s but constantly decreasing since then.
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  • Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems
Creation-Date May 2016
Auteur /Author Nicolas GAVOILLE - Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia - Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France - Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords Political Legislation Cycle - Legislative production - Economic theory of legislation -Semipresidential government system - Hierarchical Poisson regression
Classification-JEL : D72, C49, H61, H62
Abstract The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator focuses on voters’ welfare to be reelected. This paper tests the theory on the French semipresidential system, characterized by direct election of both the executive and the legislature. We use a dataset that encompasses all the approved voted legis-lation in France from 1959 to 2012 at a monthly rate, and find a dual cycle of the production of laws, connected to both the presidential and the legislative elections.
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  • Sen is not a capability theorist
Creation-Date December 2015
Auteur /Author Antoinette BAUJARD - University of Lyon, UJM, GATE L-SE (UMR CNRS 5824), France
Auteur /Author Muriel GILARDONE - Normandie University, University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), France
Mots clés / Keywords Capability, capability theory, welfarism, justice, operationalization, paternalism, agency, public reasoning
Classification-JEL : A13, B41, D63, D79, I31
Abstract According to the standard reading, Sen’s contribution to justice consists in the defense of a capability theory, i.e. of a simple switch of focus from utility to capability. This paper aims to undermine this standard reading. We claim that this capability-theory view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities : social welfare is the aggregation of individual welfares, where welfare is properly defined by capabilities. We show that this view is inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of what should count for the evaluation of social states, and how it should count. The value attributed to agency in Sen’s idea of justice is such that the process of choosing better policies trumps the substantive definition of what welfare should be. We defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen’s thought : capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism ; it is an argumentative step that does not imply a definitive commitment to a capability theory. We conclude that a fruitful discussion of his alternative theory of justice requires that we relocate his main contribution : we should see it as pertaining to a theory of public reasoning, not a theory based on a specific material of justice.
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  • The Political Economy of Renewable Energies
Creation-Date January 2015
Auteur /Author Isabelle CADORET - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France - Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords renewable energy sources, energy policy, quality of government, lobbying, political ideology
Classification-JEL : Q28, H54, H87, D72, D73, D78
Abstract This paper empirically analyzes how political factors affect the deployment of renewable energy (RE) sources and compares it to other economic, energy and environmental drivers that have received greater attention in the literature so far. The sample encompasses the EU countries bound to attain the target of 20% share of gross final energy consumption by 2020. The panel data analysis shows that lobbying by the agricultural industry negatively affect RE deployment, whereas standard measures of government quality show a positive effect ; furthermore left-wing parties promote the deployment of RE more than right wing ones, but this effect is reduced when the governing coalition is highly concentrated. Among the control variables, economic growth shows a positive impact on RE deployment.
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  • Rewarding Judicial Independance : Evidence from the Italian Constitutional court
Creation-Date June 2014
Auteur /Author Nadia FIORINO - Dipartimento di Sistemi e Istituzioni per l’Economia, Università degli Studi dell’Aquila, Italy
Auteur /Author Nicolas GAVOILLE - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France - Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords Judicial independence, revisionist view, post Court political appointments
Classification-JEL : D72, H1
Abstract We use data about the Italian Constitutional Court (1956-2005) to verify an implication of the “revisionist” explanations of judicial independence with respect to judicial appointments, namely that elected politicians reward more independent justices with appointments after the Court tenure. The empirical strategy is two-step. First, we estimate a logit fixed-effect model to evaluate the personal degree of independence for each Italian justice reporter. This “judge-effect” is based on the proneness of a judge to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of a law controlling for the environmental conditional phenomena. Second, we verify to what extent this degree of independence affects the probability of obtaining a politically controlled occupation after the end of the mandate at the Court. Our results, obtained by a variety of estimators to check their robustness, strongly support the revisionist view.
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  • Whose values ? The Rise, Fragmentation and Marginalization of Collective Choice in Postwar Economics, 1940-1981
Creation-Date May 2014
Auteur /Author Béatrice CHERRIER - CREM CNRS UMR 6211, University of Caen Basse-Normandie, France
Auteur /Author Jean-Baptiste FLEURY - THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
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  • Aspiration Models of Committee Decision Making
Creation-Date May 2014
Auteur /Author Bernard GROFMAN - Center for the Study of Democracy and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine
Auteur /Author Joseph GODFREY - WinSet Group, LLC
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  • Public Choice, Social Choice, and Political Economy
Creation-Date November 2013
Revision-Date June 2014
Auteur /Author Dennis C. MUELLER - University of Vienna
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  • Enfranchisement and Representation : Italy 1909-1913
Creation-Date November 2013
Revision-Date June 2014
Auteur /Author Valentino LARCINESE - London School of Economics
Mots clés / Keywords democratization, voting, electoral competition, inequality, swing districts, political violence, Vatican, socialism
Abstract This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the 1912 introduction of “quasi-universal”male su¤rage in Italy. The reform increased the electorate from slightly less than three million to 8,650,000 and left the electoral rules and the district boundaries unchanged. This allows us to exploit the heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates across electoral districts to identify the causal e¤ects of franchise extension on a number of political outcomes. The reform caused an increase in the vote share of social reformers (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals), together referred to as the Estrema. One standard deviation in the share of newly enfranchised voters over the total number of registered 1913 voters caused an increase of around 2% in votes for Estrema candidates but had no impact on their parliamentary net seat gains. Enfranchisement had also no impact on the parliamentary representation of aristocracy and traditional elites. Other outcomes (the chances of having candidates from the Estrema and the Her…ndel-Hirshman index of electoral competition) were also una¤ected, with the exception of turnout, which decreased. These …ndings show that de jure political equalization did not cause major changes to political representation, although the voting choices of the formerly and newly enfranchised citizens di¤ered on average. This apparent puzzle is the consequence of the heterogeneity of the e¤ect across a number of both social and political dimensions. The paper documents elite’s e¤ort to minimize the political impact of the reform.
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  • What do you know about your mayor ? Voters’ information and jurisdiction size
Creation-Date June 2014
Revision-Date August 2015
Auteur /Author Nicolas GAVOILLE - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Jean-Michel JOSSELIN - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO - CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France - Department of Political Sciences, University Roma Tre, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords Voters, municipal elections, information, political leaders, investment policy
Classification-JEL : H11, D72, H72
Abstract This papers empirically studies the relationship between the size of a jurisdiction and the information that voters acquire to cast their vote. If political agency models consider voters’ information as exogenous, the literature on the endogenous acquisition of information suggests that the size of the jurisdiction impacts the quality of the information that voters acquire. We use the French municipal context to empirically verify this theoretical prediction. We study how the determinants of the reelection probability of the incumbent mayor change when the size of the jurisdiction varies. To do so, we define incumbent mayors’ observable personal characteristics (such as age and gender) as low quality information, and proxy high quality information by an estimate of the incumbent’s personal influence on the investment policy of the municipality during his/her mandate. Our results indicate that the larger the municipality, the lower the impact of mayor’s past policymaking on reelection probability.
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"-*What Is European Integration Really About ? A Political Guide for Economists
"

Creation-Date June 2013
Auteur /Author Enrico Spolaore, Tufts University, NBER, CESIfo and CAGE
Mots clés / Keywords
Classification-JEL :
Abstract Europe’s monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this “political guide for economists” we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established ? What are the goals and determinants of European Integration ? What is European integration really about ? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy, initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators, of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas, with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas, in a sort of chain reaction towards an “ever-closer union.” The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.
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  • Individual judgments and social choice in Sen’s idea of justice and democracy
Creation-Date May 2013
Auteur /Author Muriel Gilardone, Normandie University, University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), France
Auteur /Author Antoinette Baujard, University of Lyon, UJM, GATE L-SE (UMR CNRS 5824), France
Mots clés / Keywords Social choice theory, positional objectivity, democracy, individual judgments, justice
Classification-JEL : A13, B21, D6, D71, I3
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual reconstruction of Sen’s conception of individual judgments, through a back-and-forth analysis between his democratic theory of justice and social choice theory. Firstly, while this is never explicitly presented in Sen’s work, we highlight the importance of the three following elements in the characterization of judgments : position, objectivity and the sense of otherness. Once combined, these three conditions are necessary in order to characterize positional judgments, which, unlike individual preferences, are relevant for justice issues. Secondly, we identify two forces which, in Sen’s view, drive the evolution of such judgments : a widened informational basis and sentiments. This leads us to conclude that a relevant approach to communication, i.e., one which acknowledges the scope of positional judgments and the forces at the source of their evolution, is a third condition for a fruitful transformation of judgments. This last point constitutes, according to us, a missing element in Sen’s idea of justice.
Lien / download 2013-03-ccr.pdf

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  • The Dual Political Legislation Cycle in France
Creation-Date January 2013
Revision -Date May 2016
Auteur /Author Fabio Padovano, CREM CNRS UMR6211, Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France - DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy
Auteur /Author Nicolas Gavoille, CREM CNRS UMR6211, Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
Mots clés / Keywords Political Legislation Cycle, Economic theory of legislation, Political Budget Cycle, Hierarchical Poisson regression
Classification-JEL : D72, C49, H61, H62
Résumé / abstract This paper tests the Political Legislation Cycle theory on French data. The theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator increases voters’ utility in order to be reelected. France is unique in that two elections set up the pace of political life : the presidential and the legislative elections which potentially generate a dual legislation cycle. A hierarchical Poisson model is implemented on a sample containing the monthly legislative production from January 1959 to March 2012. We found that 1) a dual cycle of the production of laws emerges, following both the presidential and the legislative elections, 2) since the constitutional reform of 2000, which synchronized the two elections, the magnitude of the cycle increased, and 3) the President of the Republic does not have an impact on the legislative production, but relies on the government.
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  • Governments and legislative production in France : the database (1959-2012)
Creation-Date January 2013
Revision-Date September 2016
Auteur /Author Nicolas Gavoille, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, Latvia - Condorcet Center, University Rennes 1, France
Mots clés / Keywords Economic theory of legislation, Quality of politicians, Political legislation cycle
Classification-JEL : Y10, H69, D72
Résumé / abstract This article introduces a new dataset focusing on the characteristics of the government members as well as on the legislative production in France, from the early months of the Vth Republic in January 1959 to the end of the XIIIth legislature in March 2012. It is composed of two distinct parts. The first part provides detailed characteristics of each government member, such as age, diploma and period in oÿce. The second part aggregates these characteristics at the government level and contains a large amount of variables covering several aspects of the legislative production, classified into three di˙erent groups : political constraints, institutional variables and legislative production. Most of the variables are observed at a monthly rate.
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  • How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose
Creation-Date November 2012
Auteur /Author Matthias Dahm, Department d’Economia and CREIP, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Reus, Spain
Auteur /Author Amihai Glazer, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
Mots clés / Keywords
Classification-JEL :
Résumé / abstract This paper addresses the puzzle of why redistributive legislation, which benefits a small minority, may pass with overwhelming majorities. It models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust ; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter’s power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase individual legislators’ incentives to resist exploitation.
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  • Buchanan on Freedom
Creation-Date June 2012
Auteur /Author Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Australia - Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA - University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, USA
Auteur /Author Michael Brooks, School of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania, Australia
Mots clés / Keywords Freedom, Liberty, Anarchy, Constitutional Contractarianism
Classification-JEL : D63, D79
Résumé / abstract Our object is to explicate Buchanan’s conception of individual liberty and to trace its connection to the ’working themes’ in his corpus-anarchy, contract, constitution, Pareto optimality, ’public choice’ and so on. In doing so, we investigate a number of tensions in Buchanan’s conception-between a libertarian affinity with anarchy and constitutional contractarianism ; and that between procedural liberalism and classical liberalism.
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  • A Theory of Cyclical Production of Laws and Decrees
Creation-Date March 2012
Auteur /Author Fabio Padovano, CREM-CNRS et Centre Condorcet, Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France ; and DIPES, University of Roma Tre
Auteur /Author Ilaria Petrarca, Centre Condorcet, Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France
Mots clés / Keywords political economy
Classification-JEL :
Résumé / abstract This paper provides a theory explaining the observed cyclical pattern of the approbation of laws and decrees through a legislature. We study an environment with three (sets of) agents, an incumbent government, unorganized voters and special interest groups. Special interest groups differ from voters in that they are better informed and can transfer private resources to the government. In return from votes and resources, the government provides two types of goods that differ in terms of their redistributive profile, a general public good and a targeted club good. To produce these goods the government must approve legislation either in the form of laws visible to all agents or decrees visible only to special interest groups. We show that the legislator generates an electoral cycle of the general public good at the end of the legislature by distorting upwards the production of laws to increase his probability of being re-elected. To signal his competence and collect the resources for the electoral campaign from the special interest groups, he also generates a pre-electoral cycle of the targeted good by distorting upwards the production of decrees. The theoretical results match the findings of the empirical literature, that detects a decree cycle at the beginning of the legislature and a law cycle at its the end.
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  • On the Political Economics of Tax Reforms : survey and empirical assessment
Creation-Date March 2012
Auteur /Author Micael Castanheira, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Auteur /Author Gaëtan Nicodème, European Commission, CESifo, CEPR and Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belg
Auteur /Author Paola Profeta, Università Bocconi, Econpubblica and Dondena, Italy, CESifo
Mots clés / Keywords political economy, taxation, personal income tax, LABREF
Classification-JEL : H11, H21, H24, P16
Résumé / abstract Political constraints and incentives are the true driver of tax reforms. This paper reviews the political economics literature on personal income tax systems and reforms to see how political mechanisms help explain tax reforms. We take some of the implications of these theories to the data using LABREF, a database that identifies labor tax reforms in the European Union for the period 2000-2007, and control for economic and labor market factors. We find that political variables carry more weight than economic variables, and we show empirical regularities that support political economy theories. We also find that governments tended to reform more in better economic times, engaging in pro-cyclical behavior.
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  • Inequality and Inter-group Conflicts – Experimental Evidence
Creation-Date January 2012
Creation-Revision March 2012
Auteur /Author Klaus Abbink, Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia
Auteur /Author David Masclet, University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, France
Auteur /Author Daniel Mirza, Université François Rabelais de Tours, France
Mots clés / Keywords Design of experiments, Experimental economics, Social Inequality, Conflicts
Classification-JEL : D72, C91
Résumé / abstract In this paper, we study the determinants of inter-groups conflicts, focusing our attention on the role of inequality aversion. First, we experimentally investigate whether inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for conflict translate into actions. Inter-group conflicts require both coordination and necessary financial material resources. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game. First, subjects play a proportional rent-seeking game to share a prize. In a second stage players can coordinate with the other members of their group to reduce (“burn”) the other group members’ payoff. Treatments differ in the degree of social inequality set between the two groups by attributing to some subjects (the advantaged group) a larger share of the price than other subjects (the disadvantaged group) for the same amount of effort. We observe frequent conflicts, where, as expected, disadvantaged groups “burn” more money than advantaged groups. Surprisingly, however the frequency of conflicts decreases with the degree of inequality. Our data allow us to identify resignation as the driving force behind this phenomenon.
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  • Unemployment insurance/severance payments and informality in developing countries
Creation-Date September 2011
Creation-Revision November 2011
Auteur /Author David Bardey, University of Rosario (Bogotá) and Toulouse School of Economics
Auteur /Author Fernando Jaramillo, University of Rosario (Bogotá)
Mots clés / Keywords Unemployment insurance, informal sector, income effects, developing countries
Classification-JEL : H55, I38 and J65
Résumé / abstract We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) benefits in developing countries reduces the e¤ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI benefits on unemployed workers’decision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-off, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between effort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of effort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI benefits decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the effort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal effect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI benefits or with severance payments mechanism.
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  • The Distribution of Social Capital, Confidence in Public Bodies, and Electoral Participation in India
Creation-Date January 2012
Creation-Revision April 2012
Auteur /Author Vani K. Borooah, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK
Auteur /Author Catherine Bros, University of Paris-Est Marne La Vallée – ERUDITE, CSH Delhi
Mots clés / Keywords
Classification-JEL :
Résumé / abstract Most studies of distribution in developing countries are concerned with the distribution of material resources, most usually income or consumption and, sometimes, wealth. On the other hand, most studies of social capital are grounded in countries of the developed world. In this paper we depart from both traditions by analysing the distribution of social capital in a developing country (India). In so doing, we establish a link with the subject matter of political economy by examining the relationship between the distribution of social capital, the distribution of confidence in public bodies, and electoral participation.
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  • When the State Mirrors the Family : The Design of Pension Systems
Creation-Date January 2012
Creation-Revision April 2012
Auteur /Author Vincenzo Galasso, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Dondena, IGIER and CEPR, Switzerland
Auteur /Author Paola Profeta, Econpubblica and Dondena, Università Bocconi, Ital
Mots clés / Keywords culture ; family ties, pension design
Classification-JEL : Z10 ; Z13 ; N30 ; H10 ; H55
Résumé / abstract We study how the prevailing internal organization of the family affected the initial design of pension systems. Our theoretical framework predicts that, in society with weak family ties, pensions systems were introduced to act as a safety net, while in societies with strong ties they replicate the tight link between generations by providing generous benefits. Using a historical classification of family ties, we show that in societies dominated by (weak ties) absolute nuclear families (f.i. Anglo-Saxon countries), safety net pension systems emerged ; and viceversa in societies dominated by strong families. These results are robust to controlling for alternative legal, religious, and political explanations. Evidence on individual data confirm these findings : US citizens whose ancestors came from countries featuring strong ties (communitarian or egalitarian nuclear) families prefer to rely on the government as a provider of old age security through generous retirement benefits.
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  • Redistribution through a « Leaky Bucket ». What explains the Leakages ?
Creation-Date April 2012
Auteur /Author Fabio Padovano, CREM-CNRS and Centre Condorcet for Political Economy, University of Rennes 1, France and DIPES, Università Roma Tre, Italy
Auteur /Author Gilberto Turati, Department of Economics and Statistics University of Torino, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords redistribution, political determinants, empirical analysis, ex ante and ex post Gini coefficients
Classification-JEL : D78, I38, H53, H11
Résumé / abstract This paper empirically examines to what extent political factors explain different performances in income redistribution in countries that vary in terms of size of the public sector, tax systems, political institutions and governance. In line with the theory, we use the difference in the ex ante and ex post Gini indices of income inequality as the measure of the degree of redistribution achieved. The estimates show that, holding the share of public spending on GDP constant, parliamentary systems and democracies achieve greater redistribution, while electoral district size, government cohesion, union influence and perceived corruption reduce redistribution. The disaggregation of spending items reveals that while transfers and interest payments do not influence redistribution, provision of public services, mainly health and education do, but the number of bureaucrats involved in such provisions has a negative impact. Within revenues, taxes on income redistribute more than other forms of levies.
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  • Political control of government enterprises : Who controls whom ?
Creation-Date January 2012
Creation-Revision March 2012
Auteur /Author Jørn Rattsø, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Auteur /Author Rune J. Sørensen, Norwegian Business School (BI)
Mots clés / Keywords Veto Player, Interest Group, Political Conflict, Corporate Governance
Classification-JEL :
Résumé / abstract Government enterprises are vulnerable to political intervention and influence of various interest groups. The theoretical literature emphasizes the role multiple and conflicting goals that distorts incentives and accountability. We offer empirical evidence of the importance of the political ownership with respect to internal and external interests in the enterprise. Our theoretical starting point is a veto player model of the relationship between two political parties and an interest group. The interest groups can exploit conflict between two political parties regarding the goals of the enterprise, and they can hold back the capacity to reform and restructure the enterprise. The empirical analyses are based on a survey questionnaire to board members and CEOs of the major government enterprises in Norway. The survey offers enterprise-specific measures of party agreement/conflict and interest group influence. The estimates suggest that political conflict increases interest group influence, both internal and external, and thereby holds back restructuring of the enterprise. Furthermore, when current revenues come from government grants, interest group influence tends to be extensive. In an extension of the analysis we show that media attention implies that board members are held more accountable.
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  • The opposite Cycles of Laws and Decrees
Creation-Date March 2012
Auteur /Author Francesco Lagona, DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy
Auteur /Author Antonello Maruotti, DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy
Auteur /Author Fabio Padovano, CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Université Rennes, 1, France and DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy
Mots clés / Keywords Economic theory of legislation - Multilevel models - Poisson regression - Political legislation cycle - Random effects - Voters - Special interest groups
Classification-JEL : H61 H62 C49
Résumé / abstract The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.
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  • Determinants of Electoral Outcomes : A simple Test of Meltzer and Richard’s Hypothesis
Creation-Date November 2011
Auteur /Author Benoît Le Maux, University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS
Auteur /Author Federica Minardy, Piemonte Orientale University
Auteur /Author Charlotte Magalhaes, University of Rennes 1
Mots clés / Keywords Vote Function, Local Government, Redistribution, Party ideology
Classification-JEL : D72 ; H20
Résumé / abstract The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.
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  • A simple microfoundation for the utilization of fragmentation indexes to measure the performance of a team
Creation-Date September 2011
Auteur /Author Benoît LE MAUX, University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS
Auteur /Author Yvon ROCABOY, University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS
Mots clés / Keywords Contest success function, Fragmentation, Herfindhal-Hirschman index, Laakso-Taagepera index, Best shot index, Weakest-link index
Classification-JEL : D70, D71, D72, D74
Résumé / abstract We propose a simple non-cooperative game model where two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a function of well-known fragmentation indexes : the Herfindhal-Hirschman index, the Laakso-Taagepera index, the Best shot index and the Weakest-link index.
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  • From Taxes to Politics, from Politics to Taxes : Evidence of Yardstick Competition in the Italian Muicipalities
Creation-Date July 2011
Auteur /Author Ilaria PETRARCA, IMT Lucca, Lucca Italy
Auteur /Author Fabio PADOVANO University of Rennes I, CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center
Mots clés / Keywords Yardstick competition, vote popularity function, spatial panel regression
Classification-JEL : C21, D72, H71
Résumé / abstract Strategic interaction in local tax setting is motivated with yardstick competition only when the fiscal decision influences the incumbents’ probability of being re-elected. Most of the previous analyses draw conclusions on yardstick competition without estimating this link or failing to find any empirical support for it. This paper, on the contrary, conducts a comprehensive test of yardstick competition on Italian Municipalities during the period 1995-2004. First, a vote popularity function is estimated. The empirical findings verify the economic voting behavior and are robust to alternative empirical specifications of the dependent variable. Then, a spatial tax setting equation is estimated. The results show a pattern of mimicking driven by a positive spatial lag coefficient and a negative spatial error coefficient. Finally, the estimated spatial correlation coefficients in time are used to investigate the dynamics of strategic interaction. The results depict a quasi monotonic pattern of convergence of the coefficients towards the lowest levels of spatial interaction, suggesting that a progressive reduction of the mimicking behavior of the incumbents has taken place.
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